This briefing note seeks to provide a short overview of significant events relating to Freedom Under Law’s work on the judiciary and the rule of law. The note aims to provide a short overview of key issues, with links to underlying documents and articles where they are available. It is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the issues raised. 

1. In Memoriam

Former KwaZulu-Natal Judge President Achmat Jappie passed away at the age of 71. Judge Jappie was appointed to the bench in 1998 and served as Judge President from 2015 until his retirement in 2021. He acted as a justice of the Constitutional Court and chaired the judicial conduct tribunals that dealt with complaints against former judge Motata and judge Makhubele.

Former Gauteng High Court judge Eberhard Bertelsmann passed away in August.

Two sitting judges also passed away. Supreme Court of Appeal Justice Fikile Mokgohloa passed away at the age of 65, reportedly after a long illness. She had been appointed to the bench in 2008, and had been a Justice of the SCA since 2019.  

Western Cape High Court judge Taswell Papier passed away at age 64. Described as a “pioneer in access to justice”, he was appointed to the bench in 2017.   

2. Judicial Appointments

After an extraordinary six-month (184 day) delay, the President announced the appointment of judges Dambuza-Mayosi and Savage to the Constitutional Court. 

These appointments meant that the Court had its full complement of permanent judges for the first time in a decade, and becomes one of only four apex courts globally to have a majority of women on the bench. 

However, the full complement of permanent judges lasted less than two months before the retirement of Justice Zukisa Tshiqi was announced. The Court is therefore again below its full complement of permanent judges. Surprisingly, the vacancy was not advertised for the JSC’s October 2026 sitting. 

The first JSC interviews of the year took place from 13 – 17 April. The JSC recommended several appointments:

• Judges Norman, Windell and Vally to the Supreme Court of Appeal;
• Judge Ledwaba as Judge President of the Gauteng High Court;
• Ms Cengani-Mbakaza, Advocate Collett, and Professor Ntlama-Makhanya to the Eastern Cape High Court; and
• Mr Barendse, advocate Davis SC, advocate Mayosi, advocate Njokweni, and advocate Van Zyl to the Western Cape High Court.

The JSC did not recommend the appointment of the only candidate for the Competition Appeal Court, Judge Dippenaar, and did not recommend the appointment of either of the candidates for the Land Court. 

As we anticipated in previewing the interviews, judge Ledwaba’s candidacy produced one of the most dramatic moments of the round. Judge Ledwaba faced questions about the allegations, made by a witness at the Madlanga Commission, that money had been earmarked to secure bail for an accused. Judge Ledwaba, presiding over a bail appeal, ultimately granted bail. Questions were also raised about his case allocation to Judge Portia Phahlane, who was subsequently arrested on charges of corruption. After lengthy deliberations, the JSC opted to recommend Judge Ledwaba’s appointment as the new Judge President of the Gauteng High Court.  

Another notable moment came when the Eastern Cape High Court interviews were abruptly cancelled after three candidates had already been interviewed. The interviews were re-started the following day. The reason given was that the JSC had “learnt of a possible conflict of interest”. Considering that these interviews had been postponed from the JSC’s October 2025 sitting due to an issue with the shortlisting process, this incident raises significant concerns about the JSC’s administrative functioning.       

FUL published an op ed reviewing the interviews, discussing the SCA appointments, the problems with the Eastern Cape interviews and the interview of Judge Ledwaba. 

The shortlist of candidates for the JSC’s October sitting has been announced. Significant vacancies include 3 positions on the SCA, the position of Deputy Judge President of the Labour Court and Labour Appeal Court, and the position of Deputy Judge President of the Eastern Cape High Court (although, as noted above, not the Constitutional Court vacancy occasioned by Justice Tshiqi’s retirement).

3. Judicial Conduct

In a highly significant development, the JSC has found that Judge President Mbenenge committed gross misconduct, declining to follow the finding of the judicial conduct tribunal.

As we discussed on our February 2026 note, the tribunal had found that Mbenenge JP had committed misconduct simpliciter, making adverse credibility findings against the complainant. The tribunal found that the judge president breached the Code of Judicial Conduct by initiating and conducting a “flirtatious relationship” with the complainant through WhatsApp messages, at a workplace and during working hours.

The JSC drew on the SCA judgment in Freedom Under Law v Judicial Service Commission as authority for its power to depart from the tribunal’s factual findings, provided it demonstrated reasons for doing so. The JSC determined that the tribunal had misdirected itself by focusing on the time and place of the “flirtatious relationship”, when what it:

“should have had regard to was not merely the place and timing of the exchanges, but their nature, content and context as well as the fact that they were admittedly initiated by JP Mbenenge and sustained over a period of time.”

By characterizing the conduct as “a flirtatious relationship at work and during working hours”, the tribunal had “understated the significance of the admitted conduct”, and failed to properly assess the extent of the contravention of the Code of Conduct.

The JSC further considered that the judge president’s conduct was “grossly inappropriate for a person holding the position of Judge (let alone a Judge President) especially in relation to a person in the position of the complainant” and was “incompatible with the standard of honourable behaviour and propriety required of judicial office.” 

The JSC further rejected the tribunal’s finding that there had not been sexual harassment, finding that the tribunal:

• had applied the incorrect standard; 
• failed to consider whether the judge president ought to have known that his conduct was unacceptable, resulting in it “focusing almost exclusively on the conduct of the complainant without giving due consideration to the conduct of JP Mbenenge”;
• considered the judge president’s advances cumulatively, rather than “considering whether particular incidents or exchanges, viewed individually and in their proper context, constituted unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature.”
• failed to properly consider the impact of the power relationship between the judge president and the complainant.       

The JSC thus concluded that Mbenenge JP’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct. Judge President Mbenenge has subsequently instituted proceedings to interdict the JSC from referring the finding to Parliament and to set aside the JSC’s finding, and has obtained an interim interdict to prevent the National Assembly from proceeding with his potential removal from office, pending finalization of the review.   

Parliament’s portfolio commission on justice and constitutional development granted judges Makhubele and Parker an extension until the end of April to make submissions on extenuating circumstances relating to the misconduct findings against them. It is not clear what further progress, if any, has been made in dealing with these matters subsequently.  

There have been a distressingly large number of referrals of complaints to judicial conduct tribunals. Several Gauteng High Court judges have been referred: Judge Lettie Mapola-Sethosa faces a complaint that she took over three years to deliver reasons for an order, whilst judge Mncedisi Kumalo   also faces complaints over delayed judgments. Judge Phahlane has been referred to a tribunal, notwithstanding ongoing criminal proceedings against her, and Judge Samuel Makamu has also been referred for allegedly soliciting a bribe in exchange for a favourable judgment (see our December 2025 – January 2026 note). 

Furthermore, Limpopo Judge President George Phatudi may face referral to a tribunal for allegedly abusing his judicial power during a case relating to a traditional leadership dispute. The Judicial Conduct Committee is to consider whether to request a referral to a tribunal. This is Phatudi JP’s second brush with the complaints process in less than a year, after he was found guilty of misconduct for presiding in a case he was involved in while he was an attorney. In that case, he was ordered to apologise and submit to a reprimand. (See our November 2025 note).

A judicial conduct tribunal into a complaint of incapacity against Free State High Court judge Lepona Lekale proceeded in July. This is, to our knowledge, the first time a tribunal has considered whether a judge suffers incapacity as a ground for potential removal from office. Judge Lekale appears to be suffering from a diabetes-related illness which has led to visual impairment and has not performed judicial duties since 2018. He has declined to take early retirement, prompting Free State Judge President Cagney Musi to lodge the complaint of incapacity. The tribunal has concluded hearing evidence, and has been postponed for the submission of written arguments.    

KwaZulu-Natal High Court judge Elsje-Marie Bezuidenhout has been found to have committed a grossly negligent breach of the code of judicial conduct and ordered to apologise for taking nearly a year to provide written reasons for discharging a rule nisi. 

4. Significant cases

Black Sash Trust and Another v Minister of Social Development and Others marks the latest stage in the long-running saga of the tender awarded by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) to Cash Paymaster Services (CPS) and the resultant setting aside of the contracts between SASSA and CPS. The Constitutional Court now had to determine whether CPS was required to repay the profits it had earned under the invalid contracts. 

FUL was the second applicant, and sought to compel the disclosure of information to ensure that the auditing and verification process contemplated by the Court’s previous judgments could allow for a proper determination of CPS’ profits. In a unanimous judgment by Majiedt J, the Court held that CPS was liable to repay SASSA an amount of R81.3 million, noting that “[i]t is time to bring an end to this relentless, seemingly interminable litigation.”      

FUL issued a statement welcoming the judgment. The statement highlighted the judgment’s importance in ensuring that private bodies exercising public functions are accountable and are bound by constitutional obligations, as well as ensuring that companies cannot profit from unlawful contracts.

Perhaps the most high-profile and consequential litigation in South Africa at present involves the potential removal from office of President Cyril Ramaphosa over the so-called “Phala Phala” scandal. To recap briefly, the case relates to the theft of foreign currency during a burglary at the President’s private residence at the Phala-Phala farm. Allegations that the foreign currency had been brought into the country illegally and had not been properly declared prompted political parties to bring a motion for the President’s potential removal from office under section 89(1) of the Constitution. An independent panel (chaired by former Chief Justice Sandile Ngcobo) found that, prima facie, the President may have violated the Constitution and the law, or committed serious misconduct.  However, Parliament voted not to proceed with an inquiry under section 89(1), and the matter was therefore not referred to an Impeachment Committee. 

On 8 May 2026, more than a year after the hearing (on 26 November 2024), the Constitutional Court handed down a judgment on a direct access challenge brought by political parties seeking to challenge the constitutionality of rule 129I of the National Assembly’s rules, as well as the National Assembly’s vote not to refer the independent panel’s report to the impeachment committee. It was argued that rule 129I infringed the constitutional obligation under section 89 to put in place an effective mechanism to hold the President accountable, and that the National Assembly vote also fell to be set aside.

The Court produced three judgments. In the first, Maya CJ (Madlanga ADCJ, Rogers J and Theron J concurring) held that rule 129I indeed constituted a failure by the National Assembly to fulfil its constitutional obligations under section 89(1), in that it: 

“permits the National Assembly to terminate the impeachment process at a preliminary stage, before a full inquiry can be conducted into whether a ground exists.  This has the effect of foreclosing full engagement with the merits of the motion, thereby stifling informed debate and undermining the values of accountability and transparency that must inform the National Assembly’s processes.”

For similar reasons, the National Assembly’s vote also constituted a failure to fulfil constitutional obligations, as it was “proscribed for the National Assembly to prematurely gatekeep within the first stage of the section 89 impeachment process.”

The second judgment, by Kollapen J (Mathopo J, Seegobin AJ and Tshiqi J concurring) found that rule 129I was constitutional. The second judgment took a different view of the meaning of section 89 of the Constitution, holding that:

“The only obligation section 89 creates is for the National Assembly to put in place a mechanism in the NA Rules to facilitate the removal of the President, if the National Assembly so elects.  … I accept that section 89 is a tool of accountability, in that it grants the National Assembly the permissive power to remove the President, but that does not translate into a constitutional obligation to hold the President accountable.”

The second judgment further held that the National Assembly vote constituted the “exercise of a permissive power by the National Assembly”, and that the challenge to the vote did not engage the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction.

The third judgment, by Majiedt J (Mhlantla J and Tolmay AJ concurring) found that rule 129I was unconstitutional, but for different reasons to the first judgment. It held that the rule:

“inserts a gatekeeping mechanism that enables the National Assembly to terminate the process before performing its constitutionally mandated function of determining whether grounds for impeachment exist once a motion for impeachment commencing the section 89(1) process has been brought.”

Additionally, the rule allowed for “the exercise of raw power granted to the National Assembly without it first considering the proposal on some factual basis.” 

Whilst the third judgment agreed with the second judgment that the Court lacked exclusive jurisdiction over the National Assembly vote, the vote lacked a lawful foundation due to the unconstitutionality of rule 129I. Therefore, a majority of the Court held that Rule 129I and the National Assembly vote were inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid. The Court ordered that the report of the independent panel be referred to the Impeachment Committee.       

President Ramaphosa then launched a review of the panel report and successfully obtained an interdict to prevent Parliament from proceeding with the section 89 process until the review application was finalized. Applications for leave to appeal against the granting of the interim interdict have been dismissed. 

In South African Human Rights Commission v Agro Data CC and Another, the Constitutional Court dealt with the nature of the Human Rights Commission’s powers. As discussed in our July – August 2024 note, the SCA had upheld a High Court judgment finding that the Commission was not entitled to a blanket order that its directives were binding. In a unanimous judgment by Nicholls AJ, the Constitutional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Commission’s mandate was “suggestive of a body designed to facilitate, engage and influence rather than control and compel”, and that it “exerts cooperative control rather than coercive control.”  

In Systems Applications Consultants (Pty) Ltd t/a Securinfo v SAP SE and Another, the Constitutional Court overturned a decision of the SCA (see the discussion in our April 2024 note) which had found that a trial judge ought to have recused himself, after having left a virtual hearing without adjourning proceedings, following a disagreement with counsel over the relevance of a question. 

Madlanga ADCJ, writing for a unanimous court, held that whilst the trial judge’s conduct had been “most regrettable”, the conduct did not amount to bias. There was no indication that the line of questioning in issue had been disregarded, and its significance had in any event been “overblown”. Whilst the trial judge’s conduct had been irregular:

“properly contextualising the conduct, the litigant would conclude that the trial Judge was merely irritated and frustrated and likely needed to “cool off”.  That was not enough to translate to a reasonable apprehension of bias.”

In Zuma and Another v Chairperson of the Judicial Commission of Inquiry into Allegations Regarding Efforts or Attempts Having Been Made to Stop the Investigation or Prosecution of Truth and Reconciliation Commission Cases and Others, a rate display of unity saw former presidents Mbeki and Zuma seek the recusal of former Constitutional Court judge Sisi Khampepe as chairperson of a commission of inquiry into allegations of executive interference with the investigation and prosecution of crimes where amnesty had bene refused by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The applicants sought Justice Khampepe’s recusal on grounds including her previous roles as a TRC commissioner and Deputy National Director of Public Prosecutions placed her in close institutional and decisional proximity to issues forming an “essential backdrop” to the Commission’s mandate. Justice Khampepe had dismissed an application for her recusal, and this decision was taken on review. IT was common cause that the applicants had not sought or obtained the consent of the Chief Justice or any other head of court in terms of section 47(1) of the Superior Courts Act, prior to instituting the review.   

The High Court, by a 2 – 1 majority, dismissed the application for non-compliance with section 47(1) without reaching the merits of the application. (It is a curious feature of the High Court judgment, noted in the judgment of Theron J, that the majority decision was handed down on 30 March 2026, with the dissent only being delivered three weeks later on 21 April 2026). The minority differed regarding the application of section 47(1), and found that the dismissal of the recusal application by Justice Khampepe was ultra vires.     

The Constitutional Court was again split. Theron J (Mlambo DCJ, Mathopo J and Mhaltla J concurring) held that Justice Khampepe did not qualify as a judge of a superior court and hence fell outside the ambit of section 47(1). On the merits, Theron J held that a reasonable apprehension of bias had been established. 

Nuku AJ (Dambuza J, Kollapen J and Majiedt J concurring) agreed with Theron J on the section 47(1) issue, but held that the applicants had not properly pleaded procedural rationality, and that the pleaded facts fell short of establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias. Nuku AJ held that it was “insufficient to ground a reasonable apprehension of bias on here institutional associations.” In a separate judgment, Rogers J agreed with the order proposed by Nuku J, but for different reasons, disagreeing that the case should fail on the pleadings, but agreeing that bias had not been established. 

Accordingly, whilst the section 47(1) point in limine did not succeed, the main review application was dismissed. 

In a historic judgment, the SCA has set aside the JSC’s decision to recommend the appointment of advocate Johannes Roelfse as a judge of the Mpumalanga High Court. In a unanimous judgment by Makgoka JA (Zondi DP, Mocumie JA and Norman and Mamosebo AJJA concurring) the court held that the JSC had failed to consider significant allegations relating to Roelofse’s judicial temperament, as well as his non-disclosure of a debt. The matter was remitted to the JSC to reconsider Roelofse’s appointment. 

It remains to be seen whether this judgment is the last word on the matter. Remarkably, the SCA found that  the JSC’s decision constituted administrative action in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act (PAJA), despite section 1(gg) of PAJA expressly excluding a decision relating to the selection or appointment of a judge from the definition of administrative action which is reviewable under the Act.

In Botha v Commission for Gender Equality, Wilson J held that commissioners of Chapter Nine institutions are not employees and are therefore not entitled to workplace benefits beyond those prescribed in legislation. A claim by the (applicant), a former commissioner of the Commission for Gender Equality, for accumulated leave was dismissed, with Wilson J describing the claim as “based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of public office, and the rights and duties that attach to it.” 

In South African Legal Practice Council v Modisakeng, the Legal Practice Council (LPC) applied to rescind an order admitting the respondent as an attorney, on the basis that the respondent had failed to comply with prescribed eligibility requirements – in particular, there was no letter of no objection from the LPC before the court when the respondent was admitted.

PA Van Niekerk J (Holland – Muter J concurring) held that the respondent had indeed failed to comply with the prescribed requirements, and that the Legal Practice Act contained no provision allowing for condonation of non-compliance with the applicable jurisdictional requirements. Holding that “[i]t is only where a statute contains a specific provision which empowers a court to condone non-compliance with that provision of a statute, that such non-compliance may be condoned”, Van Niekerk J granted the order rescinding the respondent’s admission.  

Finally, the judgment in F.J.L v T.G.O may have identified South Africa’s first instance of AI hallucinations in a judgment. The judgment was a full bench appeal from a first instance decision by an acting judge rejecting an application for the minor children of a divorced couple to be moved to a different school. In a separate judgment, Opperman J identified numerous discrepancies in the judgment of the court below, including the incorrect citation of judgments, inaccurate quotations of passages from judgments, and non-existent case names and citations. Opperman J regarded the “most plausible explanation” for these discrepancies as AI hallucinations, but did not make a definitive finding on whether AI had been used. The discrepancies constituted prima facie professional misconduct, but the acting judge had to be heard, and due process followed.

Opperman J’s judgment includes an interesting discussion about the accountability of acting judges. Opperman J held that, whilst the JSC may have jurisdiction over acting judges on a literal reading of the JSC Act, the absence of the JSC from the process of appointing acting judges created a “structural lacuna” regarding the accountability of acting judges.Whilst practically, the easiest approach would be to not appoint the acting judge to further acting stints, this approach does not impose a sanction, does not create a public record of adverse findings, and does not provide the public with any protection against an errant practitioner. 

Opperman J concluded that the LPC retained disciplinary powers over legal practitioners, such as the acting judge, and provided for the judgment to be forwarded to the LPC. 

5. Administration of justice 

In May, FUL published a research report dealing with the serious challenges facing the Constitutional Court. The report highlights how a dramatic rise in appeals, growing backlogs and procedural inefficiencies have placed the Court under increased pressure, leading to serious delays in delivering judgments. The report also discusses the problematic application of the “interests of justice” test in determining applications for leave to appeal, and sets out a range of potential solutions that could be applied in the short, medium, and long terms to address these challenges. 

The report has received extensive media coverage. FUL has also published op-eds discussing key aspects of the report, and lessons to be drawn from the study of comparative jurisdictions. 

GroundUp has reported that over 300 superior court judgments have been outstanding for over 6 months. According to the report, this is the highest number since GroundUp began reporting on outstanding judgments in December 2018. The Gauteng High Court, Pretoria is reported to have the highest number of late judgments, followed by the Johannesburg Labour Court and the Durban Labour Court. The Constitutional Court is reported to have the highest proportion of late judgments, with “[t]hirteen of 21 matters before the court … outstanding, one of which had been outstanding for more than a year.” 

The judiciary’s 2026 conference adopted resolutions reaffirming the judiciary’s commitment to establishing a single, unified judiciary, inclusive of the magistracy. The resolutions dealt with matters such as developing proposals for a judiciary-led court administration and governance model and developing an implementation plan to inter alia migrate magistrates’ courts and their administrative functions to the Office of the Chief Justice. 

Considering the importance of the governance arrangements for the judiciary under discussion at the conference, it was concerning that media reports suggesting that inflated prices may have been paid for plane tickets, accommodation and other expenses for the conference.   

The legal travails of former public protector Busisiwe Mkhwebane continue. The African Commission dismissed Mkhwebane’s claim that South Africa had breached her rights under the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights in the process of removing her from office. Then, the Legal Practice Council launched what has been described as a “detailed” and “mammoth” application to have her struck from the roll.   

In court papers responding to an application by the Helen Suzman Foundation to compel the National Assembly to consider EFF leader Julius Malema’s suitability to be a member of the JSC, the Speaker has argued that the Constitution does not empower her to initiate a process to recall Malema as a commissioner of the JSC. 

It is not clear how this argument is reconciled with section 178(3) of the Constitution, which provides that members of the JSC “who were designated or nominated to the Commission serve until they are replaced by those who designated or nominated them.”   

The Department of Justice and Constitutional Development has gazetted guidelines for the appointment of acting judges in the superior courts, SCA and specialist courts. The guidelines, which are to be “implemented incrementally with effect from 1 July 2026”, aim to set out “clear, uniform and transparent criteria and procedures” for appointment, and to “promote equitable access to acting stints in order to increase the number and quality of candidates available for appointment to the Judiciary”. 

The listed criteria include that candidates be fit and proper persons, appropriately qualified in law, and must “generally have a minimum of 12 years of continuous or cumulative experience” as a practicing advocate or attorney, a magistrate, or of lecturing in law at a tertiary institution. When making appointments, the Minister is required to consider factors including a candidate’s “demonstrable commitment … to transformation”. Save in exceptional circumstances, motivated by the head of court, an acting judge is not to serve for longer than four consecutive court terms. 

The need for more attention to be paid to the question of acting judges was highlighted by a GroundUp report that, as of the end of June, acting judges were responsible for more than half the late judgments in the superior courts.  

6. Legal Profession

An attorney and acting magistrate have been sentenced to twelve months imprisonment with the alternative of a fine after being convicted of contempt of court for failing to appear at a trial where he represented accused in a murder trial. Copies of the judgment have been sent to the LPC and the Magistrates Commission.  

7. Articles

In addition to the articles already mentioned, FUL has published op eds dealing with concerns about the appointment of retired judge Willie Seriti as an acting judge of the SCA; the continuing issue of Constitutional Court vacancies, explaining the status of the impeachment proceedings against Judge President Mbenenge, and discussing issues relating to the use of acting judges in the judicial system.

In discussing the JSC’s decision on the Mbenenge JP complaint and reviewing the JSC’s April interviews, Professor Balthazar praises the Mbenenge decision:

“It is … to the great credit of the JSC that it found that the record of evidence justified a finding of gross misconduct of a kind which is likely to involve the impeachment of the Judge President. By this action, the JSC rescued the reputation of the judiciary, sullied as it would have been had the tribunal’s recommendations been followed.”

However, the author is critical of the JSC’s handling of some of the appointment interviews, particularly the interview of Judge Dippenaar, the sole and unsuccessful candidate for the Competition Appeal Court. The author takes issue with questioning relating to “a principle of competition law which has been upheld on numerous occasions”, alleging that “Judge Dippenaar was criticised for the existence of this rule, despite her having played no part in any of the judgments that have reaffirmed it.”

There is further criticism of questions about briefing patterns in competition litigation, with the author arguing that it is unfair for a judge to be blamed for these issues:

“This unfair attack on Judge Dippenaar reflects the unfortunate practice that identity politics may still dominate the decision-making process of the JSC in certain instances and in circumstances where, to the great credit of the JSC, the South African judiciary is reasonably reflective of the demography of a country.”   

The Constitutional Court’s decision in Agro Data, on the powers of the South African Human Rights Commission, has prompted debate. Professor Pierre de Vos contrasts the decision with the Court’s jurisprudence on the binding powers of the Public Protector, a distinction he attributes to the different powers and mandate granted by the text of the Constitution.   

On the other hand, Christopher Rutledge regards the decision as “troubling”, charging that the judgment:

“strips one of the country’s most accessible human rights institutions of meaningful enforcement power and, in doing so, exposes a deeper and more uncomfortable truth: in practice, justice in SA is unevenly distributed …”

In a tribute from Justice Tshiqi’s final group of law clerks, Karabo Mahlangu, Koketšo Molope and Ella Kennedy highlight Justice Tshiqi having “created a home” in her chambers, and praise her for making her clerks “feel seen and valued.” The authors also note Justice Tshiqi’s “profound commitment to preparation and diligence”, and her “unwavering commitment to safeguarding our jurisprudence.”

“She approached every case with precision, clarity and integrity, never allowing emotion, noise or public pressure to cloud the judicial task at hand. For her, the law demanded careful reasoning, principled decision-making and fidelity to the Constitution above all else.”